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-for the N.D. Ill. (Lynch) alleging material misrepresentations 
and omissions, in connection with re~p's purchase from petr of 
'. 
3 foreign business entities, in violation of§ lO(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5, and common law - ____., 
fraud, deceit and breach of expressed contractual warranties, petr 
. 
moved for a stay of the District Court proceedings pending arbi-
tration of the dispute in accordance with the terms of the acquisition 
'------ ---------- - ----~ 0--c:fi. k~~ ~·~~ 
 .::£- /C) (-t-j { <.)j c. /l.p (_;' ' (1/B ""1-- ~~kJ. . 
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contracts and instituted arbitration proceedings. The 
District Court, on the basis of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 
~
(1953), denied the stay and enjoined petr from proceeding with 
arbitration. CA 7 (Grant, D.J., Gordon, D.J.) affirmed, one -----
judge (Stevens) dissenting. 
2. FACTS: Resp Alberto-Culver [A-C] manufactures and 
sells cosmetics in domestic and international markas and is 
centered in Illinois. Petr Scherk is a German citizen r siding 
in3witzerlaEd who formerly was engaged in the manufacture and 
sale of cosmetics in western Europe through a sole proprietorship 
manufacturing facility in Berlin [FLS] and a Liechtenstein holding 
company [SEV] licensing the sale and distribution of resp's 
cosmetics on an international basis under a variety of trademarks. 
Petr also owned another German business entity [Lodeva] which was 
and remains dormant. 
Beginning in 1967, A-C commenced negotiations with Scherk --
to acquire petr's 3 businesses. Agreement was reached in Illinois --- ------- ~ .... 
in 1968 on the basic provisions of the acquisition agreement, the 
agreements were ultimately signed, after further negotiations, in 
Vienna in January 1969, and the closing was in June 1969 in Geneva. 
The agreement provided that SEV, an entity which had no U.S. counter-·-
part, would be converted to a stock corporation and A-C would acquire - -~ -- ~ 
100% of the stock. It also provided that as to the acquisition of 
SEV and FLS: 
"The parties agree that if any controversy 
or claim shall arise out of this agreement 








request that the matter be settled by 
arbitration, the matter shall be settled 
exclusively by arbitration in accordance 
with the rules then obtaining of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, 
France •••• All arbitration proceedings 
shall be held in Paris, France, and each 
party agrees to comply in all respects 
with any award made in any such proceeding 
and to the entry of a judgment in any 
jurisdiction upon any award rendered .in 
l
such proceeding. The law of the $tate of 
Illinois U.S.A. shall apply to and govern 
thLs agreement, its interpretation and 
performance." 
Nearly a year after the closing, A-C discovered that the trademark 
---
as the CA put it. As a result, A-C sought to rescind the purchase 
:;.,~ g;reement and offered the business back to Scherk
1 
who refused to 
. , ' 
accept it. Scherk started to institute arbitration in early 1971, 
but did not file a request to arbitrate with the International 
Chamber of Commerce [ICC] until November; in the interim in June, 
resp brought the present suit based on securities and common law 
fraud. In addition to unsuccessfully moving for dismissal on 
various grounds not in issue here, including failure to state a 
cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act, petr moved for 
a stay of the District Court action pending arbitration before the 
ICC. The District Court denied the motion and enjoined petr from 
continuing with the arbitration proceedings; on interlocutory 
appeal, the CA affirmed. 
3. THE CA DECISION: The CA majority approved of the Distric ~ 
Court's reliance on Wilko v. ~' supra, where this Court held, in 
a suit by a customer against a securities brokerage firm, that an 
.. 
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agreement to arbitrate a future controversy contained in margin 
agreements was a "stipulation" waiving the right of a security buyer 
to select a judicial forum for determination of claims which might 
later arise under the Securities Act of 1933 and was, therefore, 
void under§ 14 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n, which renders void 
'------. 
"[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision binding any person ac-------- ------ ---------- --------~-------------------------quiring any security to waive compla!hce with [the Act or SEC rules] . '' ---
The Court noted in Wilko that two conflicting policies of Congress, 
one favoring the use of arbitration and the other protecting the 
rights of investors and forbidding waiver of those rights, were 
involved, and decided "that the intention of Congress concerning the 
sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such aD 
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act." 346 U.S. , 
at 438. The CA majority rejected petr's attempt to distinguish 
Wilko on the ground that a domestic transaction was involved there 
··and the rule should be otherwise when dealing with international 
transactions under the approach of M.S. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1, which held that a forum-selection clause contained 
in a towing contract negotiated at arms-length by experienced 
businessmen, providing for the litigation of any dispute in the 
High Court of Justice in London, should be specifically enforced by 
U.S. courts unless it could be shown that enforcement would be 
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for fraud 
or overreaching. Zapata did not involve the sale of securities and 
was therefore not controlling . 
- 5 -
Judge Stevens, in dissent, recognized that the relevant 
~
statutory language in§ 29(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) 
(App., at 38), was substantially identical to that in§ 14 of the 
1933 Act and it was therefore not easy to distinguish this case 
from Wilko. Nonetheless, he urged that§ 29(a) should permit 
e~ceability of certain ~ments to arbitrate disputes which 
involve a claimed violation of the 1934 Act, because enforcement in 
some circumstances, including the present ones, would not be 
contrary to the policy of the Act and, in such situations, the 
stronger policy mandated by § 201 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
---------- -
9 U.S.C. § 201, which provides for the enforcement in U.S. courts of 
the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, should override. Stressing the recognition in --
Zapata of the expansion of American business abroad in the last 20 
years, and the broad coverage of the 1934 Act to situations where 
the controversy is not between the sophisticated securities dealer 
and the average much less informed investor, but where Rule lOb-S 
is applied to "negotiated transactions in which the amount at stake 
typically justifies an independent audit or other verification of the 
property being purchased or sold, and the transfer of securities is 
a function of the form in which the parties elect to cast their 
transaction," J. Stevens thought there was correspondingly less 
_____, 
· justification for prohibiting waiver of the right to sue in t~e - -- --
district courts for securities violations. In this case, the 
dispute was covered by contract warranties and the trademark 
deficiencies were subject to pre-closing verification by a sophisti-
, 
cated American business concern so that including the "fraud" 
( ,. . 
C> 
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language of lOb-S in the complaint is far less significant than 
the desirability of having the ICC arbitrate the "questions of 
foreign law" which should determine the parties' rights in ac-
cordance with the arbitration clause in the acquisition agreements. 
4. CONTENTIONS: 
a. Petr first contends that the CA ignored and 
effectively nullified the policy of Congress as expressed in the 
1970 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201, et. ~· Resp answers 
that Wilko and § 29(a) of the 1934 Act invalidate agreements to 
arbitrate future disputes under the 1934 Act, especially in situations 
as here, where the petr violated the Act within the United States. 
Moreover, the 1958 Convention (attached as an appendix to the 
response) explicitly provides that a court of a contracting party 
need not refer a dispute to arbitration if it finds the agreement 
to arbitrate "null and void," Art. II ,f 3, and that enforcement of an 
award may be refused if the arbitration agreement "is not valid under 
the law to which the parties have subjected it," or the "recognition 
or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of [the] country" asked to enforce or recognize the award. 
b. Petr next contends that the policy considerations 
found controlling in Zapata apply with equal force to the issue o~ 
L·~. ; l ' ~ I J ~ 
enforcing arbitation clauses in international cornrra:-ce .. to in arm's 
length bargaining between sophisticated businessmen. Resp considers 
Za2ata inapplicable because it did not involve an alleged violation 
of a federal statute providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the 
federal courts, as is provided for securities violations, and for 
- 7 -
no waiver of rights under the Act as does§ 291a). Moreover, 
Zapata itself noted, 407 U.S., at 15, that a "contractual choice-
of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would 
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is 
brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision." 
c. Petr suggests Wilko should be reexamined in the 
context of sophisticated businessmen of equal bargaining strength 
operating in international commerce, along with the lines of 
Judge Stevens' dissent. Resp urges that Wilko controls and that 
the Court recognized in Superindendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life 
and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10, that "the Act protects corporations 
as well as individuals who are sellers of a security." 
d. Finally, petr invokes the specter of wide-ranging 
detrimental effects on international commercial transactions in 
which American businesses participate if, contrary to agreements to 
arbitrate before international tribunals, they can avoid arbitration 
and sue in the federal courts. Resp replies that no such effects 
will occur and all that is involved here is requiring foreigners who 
do business in this country to comply with our securities laws. 
5. DISCUSSION: The conflicting policies which the Court 
in Wilko considered "not easily reconcilable" are perhaps even more 
irreconcilable in this case where the 1934 Act is being applied to 
an alleged fraud violation arising from the acquisition by one 
sophisticated investor of the stock of another and where the element 
of international commercial transactions is involved, with the 
attendant policy considerations the Court recognized in Zapata. In 
.. 
- 8 -
short, there is much merit in Judge Stevens' dissent below. 
Still, fraud is the central target of the securities laws, even 
if common law actions are also available for remedy of the 
fraudulent activities, and Wilko found the balance to be in favor 
of application of the non-waiver provisions of the Acts. There 
is no indication that the Federal Arbitration Act's adoption of 
the 1958 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards was meant to express any greater policy in favor 
of arbitration than the older ·provisions of the Federal Arbitration 
Act nttfound so important in Wilko as to override the Securities 
Act's non-waiver provisions. Indeed, the provisions cited by resp 
, .. . a.re wholly consistent with the Wilko approach. Thus, unless the 
:··~·~ ··· , .. , . t ·· ; ,' t .: ., • . 1_.~ ~·.--·:..'.r · -.. t "~· . ·: •• • 
Court desires to consider difrerent ' rules applicable when the 
securities violation is alleged to have occurred between businessmen 
of equal bargaining strength negotiatiqn~ in international commerce, 
. .J 
Wilko was correctly applied by the CA, and the petn should be 
denied. 
There is a response. 
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JU STICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
Apr il 2 9 , 19 7 4 
Re: No. 73-781 - Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 
Dear Chief: 
I now cast a tentative vote to reverse in this case 
on the following admittedly sketchy basis: 
(1) Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-435 
states that the "right to select a judicial 
forum is the kind of •provision• that cannot 
be waived under section 14 of the Securities 
Act." 
(2) The Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, enacted 
after the Securities Act, since it has the 
status of a treaty, superseding that Act if 
there is a ~o~flict, reserves possible "public 
policy" defenses to the enforcem(-"nt stage of 
the arbitration proceeding, rather than per-
mitting them to be raised in the original action 
to compel arbitration. See Article V(2). I do 
not believe the language of Article II(3) 
-Speaking of ag-reements that are "null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed" 
is dealing with the sort of public policy defense 
that Wilko v. Swan allowed. 
- 2 -
(3) If the parties can therefore be required 
to submit the claim to arbitration, the Convention 
obviates the only claim that Wilko preserved to 
the unwilling party: the right to insist that 
the judicial forum be chosen. Any other public 
policy defenses going to the merits of the 
~rbitration award would be preserved to the 
enforcement stage • . 
The ·Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
.. r1 PvV 
/1! v 
2nd DRAFT 
: The Chief Juotico 
Mr·. Justice Dnut;las 
Mr. Just:tce j~rP.Plan 
Mr. JusUce "1/hiic 
Mr · Ju.st:i.ce i' ~·. :c.:::hal l 
tr. Just5 ce ., L:.ckmun 
-........,.~r · .Tl.:r;tico Jh~ ·el l 
Mr · Justice Rslmquis t 
From: ul:.e\lal't, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Circulated:--.- ...,...:__'> ........... ll---+-19j4.7...:::J4:___ 
No. 73-781 Recirculated: 
Fr.itz Schcrk, Petitioner, j On Writ of Certiorari . to the 




v. C Appeals for the Seventh 
erto· u ver ompany. c· ' t 
lrCUl • 
[June -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the 
Court 
Alberto-Culver Co., the- respondent, is an American 
company incorporated in Delaware with its principal 
office in Illinois. It manufactures and distributes toilet-
ries and hair products in this country and abroad. Dur-
ing the 1960's Alberto-Culver decided to expand its 
overseas operations, and as part of this program it 
approached the petitioner Fritz Scherk, a German citizen 
residing at the time of trial in Switzerland. Scherk was 
the owner of three interrelated business entities, orga-
nized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, that 
were engaged in the manufacture of toiletries and the 
licensing of trademarks for such toiletries. An initial 
contact with Scherk was made by a representative of 
Alberto-Culver in Germany in June, 1967, and negotia-
tiolls followed at further meetings in both Europe and 
the United States during 1967 and 1968. In February, 
1969 a contract was signed in Vienna, Austria, which pro-
vided for the transfer of the ownership of Scherk's enter-
prises to Alberto-Culver, along with all rights held by 
these enterprises to trademarks in cosmetic goods. The 
contract contained a number of express warranties 
whereby Scherk guaranteed the sole and unencumbered 
73-781-0:Pf:Nio:N 
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ownership of these trademarks. In addition, the con .. 
tract contained an arbitration clause providing that "any 
controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agree-
ment or the breach thereof" would be referred to arbi-
tration before the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris, France, and that "[t]he laws of the State of 
Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agree• 
ment, its interpretation and performance." 1 
The closing of the transaction took place in Geneva, 
Switzerland, in June 1969. Nearly one year later 
Alberto-Culver allegedly discovered that the trademark 
rights purchased under the contract were subject to sub-
stantial encumbrances that threatened to give others 
superior rights to the trademarks a.nd to restrict or pre-
clude Alberto-Culver's use of them. Alberto-Culver 
thereupon tendered back to Scherk the property that had 
been transferred to it and offered to rescind the contract. 
Upon Scherk's refusal, Alberto-Culver commenced this 
action for damages and other relief in a federal district 
1 The arbitration clause relating to the transfer of one of Scherk's 
business entities, similar to the clauses covering the other two, reads 
in its entirety as follows: 
"The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out 
of the agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request 
that the matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be 
settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules then 
obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Parie,. France, 
by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one 
arbitrator appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed 
by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party to make 
an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of 
the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said Chamber, 
All arbitration proceedings 8hall be held in Paris, France, and each 
party agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any 
such proceeding and to the entry of a judgment in arty jurisdiction 
upon any award rendered in such proceeding. The laws of the State 
of Illmois, U. S. A. Rhall apply to and govern this agreement, its 
interpretation and performance." 
73-781-0PIN!ON 
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court in Illinois, contending that Scherk's fraudulent rep-
resentations concerning the status of the trademark 
rights constituted violations of § 10 (b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1937, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder, 17 CFR §240.10b-5. 
In response, Scherk filed a motion to dismiss the action 
for want of personal and subject matter jurisdiction as 
well as on the basis of forum non conviens, or, alterna .. 
tively, to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris 
pursuant to the agreement of the parties. Alberto-
Culver, in turn, opposed this motion and sought a pre· 
liminary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbi-
tration proceedings.2 On December 2, 1971, the District 
Court denied Scherk's motion to dismiss, and, on Jan-
uary 14, 1972, it granted a preliminary order enjoining 
Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. In taking 
these actions the Court relied entirely on this Court's 
decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, which held that 
an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of 
a security from seeking a judicial remedy under the 
Securities Act of 1933, in view of the language of § 14 
of that Act, barring " [a] ny condition, stipulation, or 
provision binding any person acquiring any security to 
waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter . . . ." 15 U. S. C. § 77n.8 The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissent-
ing, affirmed, upon what it considered the controlling 
authority of the Wilko decision. 484 F. 2d 611. Because 
of the importance of the question presented we granted 
Scherk's petition for a writ of certiorari. - U. S. -. 
2 Scherk had taken steps to mitiate arbitration in Paris in early 
1971. He did not, however, file a formal request for arbitration with 
the International Chamber of Commerce until November 9, 1971, 
almost five months after the filing of Alberto-Culver's complaint in 
the Illinois federal court. 
3 The memorandum opinion of the District Court is unreported. 
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I 
The Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., 
reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements/ was designed to allow parties to avoid "the 
costliness and delays of litigation," and to place arbitra-
tion agreements "upon the same footing as other con-
tracts . . .. " H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1 (1924); see also S. Rep. No. 556, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1924). Accordingly, the Act provides that an arbitra-
tion agreement such as is here involved "shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con .. 
tract." 9 U. S. C. § 2.5 The Act also provides in § 3 
for a stay of proceedings in a case where a court is satis-
fied that the issue before it is arbitrable under the 
agreement, and § 4 of the Act directs a federal court to 
order parties to proceed to arbitration if there has been 
a "failure, neglect, or refusal" of any party to honor an 
agreement to arbitrate, 
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, this Court acknowl-
edged that the Act reflects a legislative recognition of 
4 English courts traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration 
agreements as "ousting" the courts of jurisdiction, and refused to en-
force such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by 
American courts as part of the common law up to the time of the 
adoption of the Arbitration Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong,, 
1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924); Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters 
Relatmg to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act, 
17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580. 
5 Section 2 of the Arbitration Act renders "valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable" written arbitration provisions "in any maritime 
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce . . ," as those terms are defined in § 1. In Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, this Court held that the stay provisions 
of § 3 apply only to the two kinds of contracts specified in §§ 1 and 2. 
Since the transaction in this case constituted "commerce . .. with 
foreign nations," 9 U S. C. § 1, the Act clearly covers this agreement. 
73-781-0PINION 
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court in Illinois, contending that Scherk's fraudulent rep-
resentations concerning the status of the trademark 
rights constituted violations of § 10 (b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1937, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, and Rule lOb-5 
promulgated thereunder, 17 CFR §240.10b-5. 
In response, Scherk filed a motion to dismiss the action 
for want of personal and subject matter jurisdiction as 
well as on the basis of forum non conviens, or, alterna-
tively, to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris 
pursuant to the agreement of the parties. Alberto-
Culver, in turn, opposed this motion and sought a pre-
liminary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbi-
tration proceedings! On December 2, 1971, the District 
Court denied Scherk's motion to dismiss, and, on Jan-
uary 14, 1972, it granted a preliminary order enjoining 
Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. In taking 
these actions the Court relied entirely on this Court's 
decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, which held that 
an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of 
a security from seeking a judicial remedy under the 
Securities Act of 1933, in view of the language of § 14 
of that Act, barring "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or 
provision binding any person acquiring any security to 
waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter . . . ." 15 U. S. C. § 77n.~ The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissent-
ing, affirmed, upon what it considered the controlling 
authority of the Wilko decision. 484 F. 2d 611. Because 
of the importance of the question presented we granted 
Scherk's petition for a writ of certiorari. - U. S. -. 
2 Scherk had taken steps to initiate arbitration in Paris in early 
1971 . He did not, however, file a formal request for arbitration with 
the International Chamber of Commerce until November 9, 1971, 
almost five month,; after the filing of Alberto-Culver's complaint in 
the Illinois federal court. 
8 The memorandum opinion of the District Court is unreported, 
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][ 
The Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U. S. C. ~ 1 et seq., 
reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements/ was designed to allow parties to avoid "the 
costliness and delays of litigation," and to place arbitra-
tion agreements "upon the same footing as other con-
tracts .... " H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1 (1924); see also S. Rep. No. 556, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1924) . Accordingly, the Act provides that an arbitra.-
tion agreement such as is here involved "shall be valid, 
jrrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con" 
tract.'' 9 U. S. C. ~ 2.5 The Act also provides in § 3 
for a stay of proceedings in a case where a court is satis-
fied that the issue before it is arbitrable under the 
agreement, and § 4 of the Act directs a federal court to 
order parties to proceed to arbitration if there has been 
a "failure, neglect, or refusal" of any party to honor an 
agreement to arbitrate 
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, this Court acknowl-
edged that the Act reflects a legislative recognition of 
4 English rourt:; trad1t ionally ron:; ide red irrevocable arbitration 
agreement~ a:s "ou~ting" the court:; of jurisdiction, and refused to en-
forcr ::;uch agrerment:; for tht~< rra~on. This vww wa~< adopted by 
Amrrican courts as part of the common law up to the time of the 
adopt10n of thr Arbitration Act. Sec H . R. Hep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 
l:st Sr:,;:;., 1, 2 (1924); Sturge:; & Murphy, Some Confusing Matter:; 
Relating to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act, 
17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5RO . 
. ~Section 2 of the ArbitratiOn Act rendPrs "valid, irrevocable, 
and enforcrablr" wr)tten arbitration provi:sion;; "in any maritime 
tran:-<aetion or a contract PvtdPnemg a tran~action involvmg com-
merre ," n~ tho::~e term:; are dPfined in§ I. In Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphu· Co., 350 lJ . S. 198, thi~< Court held that the stay provisions 
of § 3 apply only to thr two kmd~< of contract;; specified in §§ I and 2. 
Smre the transaction m tlu:; rase rotlti(Jtuted ' 'commerce ... with 
fore1gn nation,.,,'' 9 U S C.§ 1, the Act clearly cover::; this agreement. 
\ 
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the "desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the 
complications of litigation," id., at 431. but nonetheless 
declined to apply the Act's provisions. That case 
involved an agreement between Anthony Wilko and 
Hayden, Stone & Co., a large brokerage firm, under which 
Wilko agreed to purchase on margin a number of shares 
of a corporation's common stock. Wilko alleged that 
his purchase of the stock was induced by false represen· 
tations on the part of the defendant concerning the value 
of the shares, and he brought suit for damages under 
§ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77l. 
The defendant responded that Wilko had agreed to sub-
mit all controversi~s arising out of the purchase to arbi-
tration, and that this agreement, contained in a written 
margin contract between the parties, should be given full 
effect under the Arbitration Act, 
The Court found that " [ t] wo policies, not easily rec-
oncilable, [are] involved in this case." 346 U. S., at 
438. On the one hand, the Arbitration Act stressed "the 
need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation," id,, 
at 431, and directed that such agreements be "valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable" in federal courts. On the 
other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 was "[d]esigned to 
protect investors" and to require "issuers, underwriters, 
and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the charac-
ter of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce 
and to prevent fraud in their sale," by creating ua special 
right to recover for misrepresentation .... " I d., at 431 
(footnote omitted) . In particular, the Court noted that 
~ 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S. C. ~ 77n, provides: 
' 'Any condition , stipulation, or provision binding 
auy person acquinng any security to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this subchapter or of 
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall 
be VOid.'' 
Thf' Court ruled that an agreement to arbitrate "is a 
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'stipulation,' and [that 1 the right to select the judicial 
forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived 
under § 14 of the Securities Act." (i Thus, Wilko's 
advance agreement to arbitrate any disputes subse-
quently ansing out of his contract to purchase the securi-
ties was unenforcable under the terms of § 14 of the 
Securities Act of 1933. 
Alberto-Culver, relying on this precedent, contends 
that the District Court and Court of Appeals were correct 
1n holding that its agreement to arbitrate disputes arising 
under the contract with Scherk is similarly unenforceable 
in VIew of its contentions that Scherk's conduct consti-
t.uted violations of the 3ecurities Exchange Act of 1934 
and rules promulgated thereunder. For the reasons that 
follow, we reject this contention and hold that the pro-
visions of the Arbitration Act cannot be ignored in this 
case. 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that even the 
semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control 
the case before us. Wilko concerned a suit brought 
under ~ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which pro-
vides a defrauded purchaser with the "special right" of 
a private remedy for civil liability, 346 U. S., at 431. 
'1 ThC' arb1trahon agr<'C'ment mvolved m Wilko was cont2ined in a 
~tnndard form margin contract. But SC'e the dissmting opinion of 
Mr . . Justice FrankfurtC'r, :Wi U. 8., at 439, 440, concluding that the 
record d1d not show that "tlw plaintiff [Wilko] in opening an ac-
rount had no chmce but to accept thC' arbitratiOn stipulation .... " 
Tlw pC'titJOnC'r here would limit the decision in Wilko to situation~ 
where the partie'S c•xlHbJt a dispanty of bargaining power, and con-
tend;; that, sincC' thC' 1wgotiation;; IC'ading to the present contract took 
placC' over a numbC'r of yC'ar~ and involved the participation on both 
;ndC'S of knowlC'dgC'able and t;oplu;;ticated bu~iness and legal experts, 
thP Wilko decision should not apply. See also the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Stevens of the Court of Apprals in this case, 484 F. 2d, at 
615 Because of our dispos1t10n of th1s case on other grounds, we 
need not con;;Jder th1s contention . 
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There is no statutory counterpart of § 12 (2) in the 
Securities Exchange Apt of 1934, and neither § 10 (b) 
of that Act nor Rule 10b-5 speaks of a private remedy 
to redress violations of the kind alleged here. While 
federal case law has established that § 10 (b) and Rule 
lOb-5 create an implied private cause of action, see 
·'6 Loss, Securities 3869-3873 (1969) and cases cited 
therein; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1963), 
the Act itself does not establish the "special right" that 
the Court in Wilko found significant. Furthermore, 
while both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 contain sections barring waiver of 
compliance with any "provision" of the respective acts/ 
·certain of the "provisions" of the 1933 Act that the Court 
held could not be waived by Wilko's agreement to arbi-
trate find no counterpart in the 1934 Act. In particular, 
the Court in Wilko noted that the jurisdictional provision 
'of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77v, allowed a plaintiff to 
bring suit "in any court of competent jurisdiction-
federal or state-and removal from a state court is pro-
hibited." 346 U. S., at 431. The equivalent provision 
of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for suit only in the 
federal district courts that have "exclusive jurisdiction," 
7 Section 14 of the Securities Act. of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77n, 
provides as follows · 
' 'Any cond1tion, ~tipnlation, or provision binding any person ac-
. qulring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this 
subchapter or of the ntles and n~gulations of the Commission shall be 
void." 
Sertwn 29 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78cc (a), provides : 
" Any condition, stipulation or provi::don binding nny person to 
waive comp.linnce with any provision of th1s chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange reqmred thereby 
shall be void ," 
While the two sections are not identical, the variations in their word-
ing ~eem irrelevant to the issue presented in this case. 
SCHER.K v. ALBERTO-CULVE.R CO. 
15 U. S. C. § 78aa, thus significantly restricting the plain• 
tiff's choice of forum . 
Even if it could be said, however, that the operative 
portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in 
Wilko are contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the respondent's reliance on Wilko in this case 
ignores the significant and , we find, crucial differences 
between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one 
signed by the parties here. Alberto-Culver's contract 
to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was 
a truly international agreement. Alberto-Culver is an 
American corporation with its principal place of business 
and the vast bulk of its activity in this country, while 
Scherk is a citizen of Germany whose companies were 
organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein. 
The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract 
in Austria and to the closing in Switzerland took place 
in the United States, England, and Germany, and 
involved consultations with legal and trademark experts 
from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein. 
Finally, and most significantly, the subject matter of the 
contract concerned the sale of business enterprises orga-
nized under the laws of and primarily situated in Euro-
pean countries, and whose activities were largely, if not 
entirely, directed to European markets. 
Such a contract involves considerations and policies 
significantly different from those found controlling in 
Wilko. In Wilko , quite apart from the arbitration pro-
vision, there was no question but that the laws of the 
United States generally, and the federal securities laws 
in particular~ would govern disputes arising out of the 
stock purchase agreement. The parties, the negotia-
tions, and the subject matter of the contract were all 
situated in this country, and no credible claim could have 
been entertained that any international conflict of laws 
problems would arise. In this case, by contrast, in the 
r: •• 
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absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncer-
tainty existed at the time of the agreement, and still 
exists, concerning the law applicable to the resolution of 
disputes arising out of the contract.8 
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with 
respect to any contract touching two or more countries, 
each with its own substantive laws and conflict of law 
rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the 
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to 
be applied is, therefore. an almost indispensable precon-
dition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability 
essential to any international business transaction. Fur-
thermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a 
dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a 
forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or 
unfamiliar with the problem area involved.u 
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to 
enforce an international arbitration agreement would 
not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite 
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the 
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the 
prrsent case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if 
8 Togrther WJth its motiOn for a stay pending arbitration, Scherk 
moved that the complaint be dismissed because the federal securi-
ties laws do not apply to this mtrrnational transaction, cf. Leasco 
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F. 2d 1326 (CA2 
1972) Sine!' only the order granting the injunction was appealrd, 
tllli:l contention was not considered by the Court of Appeals and IS 
not hPfore th1s Court 
u Sre Quigley, Accession by the Umted States to the Umted Nations 
Convention on the Rreognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 70 Yale L ,J 1049, 1051 (1961), For example, while the 
arbitration agreement involvrd hrn' provided that thr controver-
sJe.,; ansing out of the agrerment be resolvrd under "[t]he laws of 
the 8tate of IllinOJs," supra, n. 1, a determination of the existence 
and Pxtent of fraud concerning thr trademarks would neces::;arily 
involvr an understanding of foreign law on that ~ubiect. 
' . 
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cherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would bE! 
able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he 
might have sought an order in France or some other 
country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding with 
its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition 
the courts of this country might ultimately have granted 
to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of 
such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the 
fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil 
the willingnes and ability of businessmen to enter into 
international commercial agreements. 
The exception to the clear provisions of the Arbitration 
Act carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case 
such as the one before us. In Wilko the Court reasoned 
that "[w]hen the security buyer, prior to any violation 
of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he 
gives up more than would a participant in other business 
transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of 
courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advan-
tages the Act gives him ... . " 346 U. S,, at 435. In the 
context of an international contract, however, these 
advantages become chimerical since, as indicated above, 
an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign 
court block or hinder access to the American court of the 
purchaser's choice, 
Two Terms ago in The Brernen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U. S. 1, we rejected the doctrine that a forum-
selection clause of a contract, although voluntarily 
adopted by the parties, will not be respected in a suit 
brought in the United States "unless the selected state 
would provide a more convenient forum than the state 
m which suit is brought." !d., at 7. Rather, we con-
cluded that a "forum clause should control absent a 
strong showing that it should be set aside." I d., at 15. 
We noted that "much uncertainty and possibly great 
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inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could 
be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident 
might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place 
[where personal or in rem jurisdiction might be estab-
lished] . The elmination of all such uncertainties by 
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties 
is an indispensable element in international trade, com-
merce, and contracting." !d., at 13-14. 
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal 
is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause 
that posits not only the situs of suit but also the pro-
cedure to be used in resolving the dispute.' 0 The invali-
dation of such an agreement in the case before us would 
not only allow the respondent to repudiate his solemn 
promise but would, as well, reflect a "parochial concept 
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in 
our courts . . . . We cannot have trade and commerce 
in world markets and international waters exclusively on 
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our 
courts. !d., at 9.11 
For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of 
the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising 
10 Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a 
certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of 
that plac~> to apply to that transaction. In this case, however, " [ t]he 
laws of the State of Illinois" were explicitly made applicable by the 
arbitration agreement. See n. 1, s'Upra. 
11 In The Bremen we uoted that forum-selection clauses "should be 
given full effect" when ''a freely negotiated private international 
agreement [is] unaffected by fraud .. .. " 407 U. S. 1, 12-13. This 
qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of 
a tram;action is based upon an allegation of fraud, as in this case, the 
clause 1s unenforceable. Rather, 1t means that an arbitration or 
forum-selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclu,sion 
of that cla'Use in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion, 
Compare Pnma Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg . Co., 388 U. S. 
395. 
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out of their international commercial transaction is to be 
respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord 
with the explicit prc>visions of the Arbitration Act.12 
12 Our conclusion today is confirmed by international develop-
ments and domestic lrgislation in the area of commercial arbitra-
tion subsequent to the fVilko decision. On June 10, 1958, a special 
conference of the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
adoptrd the Convention on the Hecognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards. In 1970 the Senate approved the treaty, 
3 U.S. T . 2517, T . I. A. S. No. 6997, and Congress passed Chapter 2 
of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §§ 201 ff., in order 
to implement the Convention. Section 1 of the new chapter provides 
unequivocally that the Convention "shall be enforced in United 
States courts in accordance with this chapter." 
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying 
American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in 
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agree-
ments to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in 
the signatory countries. See Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. E. 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1968); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L . .J. 1049 (1961). Article II (1) of the 
Convention provides: 
"Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing 
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or 
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them 
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual 
or not, concerning n subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration." 
In the1r discussion of this Article, the delegates to the Convention 
voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which 
an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be per-
mitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of 
parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would 
diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements. See Haight, 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference 
24-28 (1958). 
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals i~ 
reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
the consideration~> expressed in this opmwn, would require of its 
()Wll force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present 
case, we think that this country'~ adoption and ratification of the 
Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbi-
tration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional 
policy consistrnt with the decision we reach today. 
~tt <!Jl11td cf t~ t 'Jttnii:dt .§faftil 
~nnlrf.lrgfott. gl. <.q. '2!lgtJ!:;1 
CHAMBER S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS May 30, 1974 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have sent to the printer a dissent in No. 73-781 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company. 
Yours faithfully, 
~V; 
William 0. Douglas 
I 
2, 1974 
No. 73-781 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
If I can find the time this week I may add a few 
paragraph in a concurrence recording my view with respect 
to the Securities Acts as applicable in this case. 
Stewart 
lfp/ss 
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No. 73-781 SCHERK v. ALBERTO-CULVER COMPANY 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I concur in the opinion of the Court and write only to 
address an additional issue. This action was instituted 
by Alberto-Culver, alleging that it was defrauded in the 
acquisition of Sherk's businesses in violation of § lO(b) 
and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1931. 
In my view that Act has no application whatever to the 
transaction involved in this litigation. Indeed, its 
application here finds no support in the terms of the Act 
and is a perversion of plain congressional intent and 
~~· purpose reflected in the Act. 
Section lO(b), in relevant part, provides that it 
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by use of the mails or any instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative 
or deceptive device in contravention of such rules and 




Rule lOb-5, in somewhat expansive terms, amplifies and makes 
more specific the language of § lO(b). But the core of these 
provisions, as well indeed as of the entire Act, is the term 
"security". Unless a security is purchased or sold the Act 
simply does not apply. Section (a)(lO) [15 u.s.c. -
78(c)(a)(lO)) defines the term "security" broadly.* 
Nothing is contained in the definition which remotely 
embraces a purchase or sale of the assets of a business, 
certainly in a context like the transaction involved in this 
ease. 
The relevant facts, as found by the District Court, 
are as follows: Seherk owned several businesses engaged 
in the manufacture and distribution of cosmetic products 
primarily in Western 2BXap¥a Europe. Following protracted 
negotiations, in which Alberto was represented by three 
*Mere quote the entire paragraph defining security. 
3. 
law firms, an international accounting firm and patent 
counsel, an agreement of purchase and sale of three of 
Scherk's businesses was executed by the parties. One of 
these businesses, SEV, was a iiBBkBXxki••hxsaK Liechtenstein 
business entity with no American counterpart, and as a part 
of the transaction and at the request of Alberto SEV was 
converted into Liechtenstein stock corporation. It was 
SEV which held the trademarks involved in this litigation. 
As the District Court noted: 
"The gist of plaintiff's complaint is that 
defendant misrepresented the value and validity 
of certain trademarks held by SEV which were 
an integral component of the transaction in 
question." 
The District Court held that the transfer of all of SEV's 
stock was a sale of securities within the meaning of § lO(b) 
of the Act. The Court of Appeals, with Judge Stevens 
dissenting, affirmed.* 
*the shares of one of the other businesses purchased, a 
German corporation, were also transferred. But the alleged 
fraud relates to the trademarks held by SEV. 
4. 
In a case of this kind, the substance of the transaction, 
not its form, should control. As the District Court found, 
and indeed, the parties concede, Alberto-Culver desired to 
acquire and in fact did acquire "three business entities". 
These included a German corporation, a sole proprietorship, 
and a Liechtenstein corporation formed upon the insistence 
of Alberto-Culver. Indeed, as conceded in oral argument 
Alberto-Culver insisted on the incorporation of this entity 
for its own tax purposes.* Normally, a corporation desiring 
to acquire another corporation will pursue one of three 
methods: (i) merger; (ii)purchase of stock, Which may be 
followed by a liquidation; and (iii) purchase of assets 
and assumption of liabilities. The selection of the acquisition 
method is usually influenced in major part by tax consequences, 
*Cbeck the oral argument near the end to verify the 
above. 
5. 
whether the stock of the corporation to be acquired is 
widely held, whether 100% ownership is desired, and various 
other business considerations. 
Where a proprietorship or partnership is acquired, 
the transaction may take the form simply of a sale of assets 
or there may be an incorporation ai preliminary to the 
transfer. It is unnecessary to say that no acquisition of 
an entire business, where the method employed is transfer 
of stock, is ever convered by lO(b) of the Act. There 
may be situations where the substance or essence of the 
transaction is in fact the purchase and sale of securities. 
But certainly in a case where one large business interest 
is seeking to ~ acquire the entire business of another 
large interest for the purpose of operating it, if blinks 
reality to say that a a•••xtx, security's transaction 
occurs within the language and intent of § lO(b). In this 
case Alberto•Culver's purpose was to acquire these business 
entities - their assets and going concern value - in 
Western Europe. Alberto-Culver desired to operate these 
businesses itself, and was free from the time of acquisition 
6. 
to convert them into such business forms as best suited 
its tax and business purposes. It is plain that Alberto• 
Culver had no interest in merely becoming a shareholder in 
Scherk's enterprises. In short, the purchase here was not 
in any realistic sense a security's transaction. It was the 
100% acquisition of businesses by a strong, sophisticated 
purchaser fully capable of making all necessary investigations, 
and which indeed did make such investigations through 
American and European and accountants. 
There is nothing in the history or language structures 
of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 which remotely 
suggest an intent or purpose to apply to transactions such 
as this or to afford protection to parties such as Alberto-
Culver.* 
*tn Wilko v. Swan, 346 u.s. 427, 435 {1953), the Court 
commented tha~t is clear that the Securities Act was 
drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which 
buyers [of securities] labor. Issuers of and dealers in 
securities have better opportunities to investigate and 
appraise the prospective earnings and business plans 
affecting securities than buyers." 








Mr. John Jeffries 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: June 3, 1974 
No. 73-!81 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Here is a rough draft of a concurrence in Alberto-Culver 
which I would appreciate your putting in appropriate form, 
assuming that you see no fatal flaw in my reasoning. 
I am aware that there are Circuit Court opinions which 
have gone quite far in applying lO(b) and lOb-S to transactions 
that I would consider not within the scope of the Act. One 
or two of these cases are cited in the opinions below. I 
would appreciate your adding in a note a reference to at least 
two or three of such cases, indicating that although some 
Circuit Courts have gone rather far in extending the original 
purpose and meaning of§ lO(b), this Court has had no occasion 
to consider the application of the Act to a situation comparable 
to that presently involved. 
One other point. Justice Stewart's opinion does not 
mention this issue, as it was not presented to us as one of 
the errors assigned. I will ask Justice Stewart to add a note 
to his opinion stating that for this reason the Court does 
not address the issue. If he is unwilling to do this, I will 
have to add a note genera.lly to that effect, and saying further 
2. 
that in my view this issue having been raised by the pleadings ~ 
and considered by the courts below is one which we are free to 
consider and as it goes to the viability of the entire litiga-
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~nsltitt,g±ntt, :!fL <II • .20543 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 4~ 1974 
Re~ N:C?· 71-781 - §.:her~ v. Al]?erto-Culver Co. 
Dear Potter: 
Wbilel aar•• with t- ~••ult you. rea:eh and with moat Ql 
the reaaoning by •bleb you arriv• at that reeult, 1 have some 
difficulty at two pointe in your propo•ed opinion. 1 hopt~ you do 
not mind too much tf 1 venture to state the source• of my difficulty. 
f A 1. I euapeet the benefit o£ the rather technical dietinetion 
t.1J ~rv~W /r~A you draw betweeD. the 11epec:1al rightH in '!ilko and ita abaenee in 
~f J ~{ . tbia ea•e f dleeu•••d on pages 6-s· is marginal and doe• uot really 
, ~ ~ juttify it• ineluaion. I am not entirely certain that 1 agre"e with 
J~ the dletinction. 1t •••m• to me that tb implied right of action 
J JR:;; under the Cou.l't'a deciaton• 1• not diffe~n.t from th• •o ... uUecl 
'1.. · . .. {1 u•peeial right11 in ~ Vlilko caee, tinc:e the implied right adhere• 
Jid~~ "r" .L to ltule lOb-5 and § 10 of the Act, and is the.-eby lnc:luded in the 
·~ J ~ V' ew&ep of S 29(a). I ••• no apparent rea.e011 why the two are 
unl.J. cAJ:J~~- different. Evan if the diatinetion ie a p:roper one, you hint on 
--1-r ~'fb... J page 8 that the di.ecuaeion 1 som....,ha.t gra.tuit ue. For me, it 
1.,u.o ~-u_~ :rabee more quei!Jtiona than lt anawere and it aeema that it 18 
likely to v<>•• problema in later caaae in which the waiftr pro .. 
vleione are •••erted aa a d.ef•n.ee. 
<ft{A, ~ t ~ a.. 1 am in~Uned to b4tlieve that more prominence should 
~ be given to the Arbitral Convention and to those provisions of the 
c. _ r!J '~~'; United State• Arbitration Act that make the Convention a part of 
t.vlffl..~ thelaw of tbte country. Thi• ia more a matter o! empha.ab than 
~~ subetanee, but it 18, I beli.eve . • important. You r.efer to the Con-
Ct. Ult.cH/L_!ention in your final footnote. but I wonder whether it doea not 
wJt.. deserve a higher le,_l of zecognition. I would propo•e that the 
A 1 . lollowing, or ecmethi.ng •imilar to it, be inserted •fter your 't1A.A.. , ~n-u. first: para.g,..aph on page 4 of your opini•r.H 
.~. 
- z-
"Chapter Z of the Act, 9 U. S. C. §§ ZO 1, 
et ••9·, provide• for the recognition and enforce-
ment of :foraign arbitral awards. It wae enacted 
in 1970 to implement the Unitecl Nation• Conwntion 
on the cognition and Enforcer.nent of Foreign 
Arbitral Award•. etta 1 of the new chapter un-
equivocally providtta that the Convention 'shall be 
enforced in United. State• court• in accordance with 
thia chapter. I The goal Of the Ccm...-ntiOn, &nd the 
principal purpoee underlying American adoption of 
it and ita implementation, waa to encourage the rec: .. 
ognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration 
agr .. menta in interD&ticmal contract• and to unify 
the standard• by which aareementa to a.rbitrate are 
obeerved and a ._bJ-tnl awarcl• are enforced in signa-
tory coUDtriea.- Article U(3) of the Convention 
provide a: 
'The cCMart of a Contra.c:ting State, when 
seized of an actioa in a matter in re•pec:t 
of which tiMt parties have made an agree· 
ment within the meaning of thi.• article, 
eball, at the reque•t of one of the partie•, 
refer the partie• to arbitration unlee• it 
find• that the said agreement ie cull and 
void, inoperative or incapable of beina 
performed. ' 
Thue, a low court, when lei &eel of an action like the 
pretent c:aee, ahould, at the NfiUet of one of the 
partie•, refer the partie• to arbitration, unlet• tbe 
arbitral agi'W111ent b 'aull &ftd -.oid, iRoperatiw or 
incapable of being perfot"med. '!!/ Hen, reapondent 
contend• that the agJ"Mment t• voided by S 29(a) of the 
Securitiee Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. c. § 78cc(a). 
providing: 
'Any condition, atipulation, or provieion 
binding any ~reon to 'W&ive c:ompUance 
with any provieion of thie chapter o r of 
- l -
any rule or rqulation thereunder, or 
of any rule of an exchange required 
thereby shall be void.' 11 
The two footnote• would be., reapectively: 
"*I 
- s .. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce· 
ment of Foreian Arbitral Awarde, S. Exec. E. 90th Cona. , 
Zd Seee. (1968): Quigley, Acceaaion by the United State• 
to the United Natioaa Coa:nntion on the Recosllitt.on and 
Enforcement of Foreian Arbitral Award•, 70 Yale L. J. 
1049 (1961). tl 
ll •• , - Article n(l) alao limita recognition of agree-
mente to thoee •concerning a subject matter capable of 
eettlement by arbitration. • The leauee raiaed tn thia caee 
are appropriate for arbitration. See db cue aion, infra, 
page_.'' 
You will obeene th&t much of the pnceding paraaraph track• 
material in your preaent footnote lZ. 
3. 1 would be inclbed to add the following to footnote 11. 
"Altbouah we do not decide the queation., pn-
•umably the type of fraud alleged here could be 
challenged, under Article V of the Co.n.vation, ln the 
enforcement of whatever arbitral award ia produced 
through arbitration. Article V(Z)(b) provide• that 
recognition and eDforcernent Of u award caa be re-
fused if 'recoanition or enfol'cement of tM award 
would be ccm.trary to the public policy of that cOUDtry. •" 
The•e are my thought•. for what they may be worth. 1 am 
taking the Uberty of aendin.l cople• of thie letter to the Chief, 
. ' 
-. .. 
Lewia, and Bill Rehnquiat, who, aloq with us, have indicated 
a vote to rever••· 
cc: The Chief Ju•tice / 
Mr. Ju•tice Pow.U 
Mr. .Juatice Rehnqui•t 
Sincerely, · 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUI S T 
.:§u.vrtmt Q):a-nrl cf tlft ~ttifth .:§tafts 
~asfrin:ghm. tEJ. Q):. Z·.(JgtJ!.~ 
June 5, 1974 
Re: Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in the opinion for the Court you 
have prepared in this case. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
w-:~---· 
To The Chief' J'usff~.g...;-:·':-." 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice M~rshall 
4th DRAFT 
Mr. ,Tusttco BJ.'lC1'mun 
If .• ·. .!us·J:ice Powell ...----
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~ES JL·suce Rehnquist 
From: Dougl~s; J. 
No. 73-781 
Circulate: ~----~~- ­
Fritz Scherk Petitioner ) On Writ of CerlJ.:\@a¥tct&!.!i!~d: v: ' United States Court of 
Alb t C 1 C Appeals for the Seventh er o- u ver ompany. Circuit. 
[May-, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting. 
Respondent (Alberto) is a publicly held corporation 
whose stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Alberto, a Delaware Corporation, has its principal place 
of business in Illinois. Petitioner (Scherk) owned a 
business in Germany, FLS (Firma Ludwig Scherk), deal-
ing with cosmetics and toiletries. Scherk owned various 
trade marks and all outstanding securities of a Liechten-
stein corporation (SEV) and of a German corporation 
(Lodeva). Scherk owned various trade marks which 
were licensed to manufacturers and distributors in Europe 
and in this country. SEV collected the royalties on those 
licenses. 
Alberto undertook to purchase from Scherk the entire 
establishment-the trade marks and the stock of the two 
corporations; and later, alleging it had been defrauded, 
brought this suit in the U. S. District Court in Illinois to 
rescind the agreement and to receive damages. 
The only defense, material at this stage of the proceed-
ing is a provision of the contract providing that if any 
controversy or claim arises under the agreement the 
parties agree it will be settled "exclusively" by arbitration 
under the rules of the International Chamber of Com-
merce, Paris, France. 
The basic dispute between the parties concerned aile .. 
gations that the trademarks which were basic assets in 
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the transaction were encumbered and that their purchase 
was induced through serious instances of fraudulent 
representations and omissions by Scherk and his agents 
within the jurisdiction of the United States. If a ques-
tion of trademarks were the only one involved the prin-
ciple of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 
would be controlling. 
We have here, however, questions under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 which in§ 3 (a) (10) defines "secu-
rity" as including any "note, stock, treasury stock, bonds, 
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement . . . . " 15 U.S. C.§ 78c (a) (10). 
We held in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, as 
respects § 3 (a) ( 1 0) . 
" . . . [R]emedial legislation should be construed ' 
broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities 
Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the category 
of remedial legislation. One of its central purposes 
is to protect investors thr~ugh the requirement of full 
disclosure by issuers of securities, and the definition 
of security in § 3 (a)(10) necessarily determines the 
classes of investments and investors which will re-
ceive the Act's protections. Finally, we are re-
minded that, in searching for the meaning and scope 
of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be 
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should 
be on economic reality." !d., at 336. (Footnote 
omitted.) 
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for 
any person by use of agencies of interstate commerce or 
the mails "to use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security," whether or not registered 
on a national securities exchange, "any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 
15 u. s. c. § 78j (b). 
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Alberto, as noted, is not a private person but a corpora-
tion with publicly held stock listed on the New York Ex-
change. If it is to be believed, if in other words the 
allegations made are proven, the American company has 
been defrauded by the issuance of "securities" (promis-
sory notes) for assets which are worthless or of a much 
lower value than represented. The Regulations of the 
Commission state : 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen• 
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 17 CFR 
§ 240.10b-5. 
Section 2g. (a) of the Act provides: 
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding 
any person to waive compliance with any provision 
of this chapter or of any rule or regulation there-
under, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby 
shall be void.'' 15 U. S. C. § 78cc (a) . 
And § 29 (b) adds that "every contract" made in vio-
lation of the Act "shall be void." 1 No exception is made 
1 Section 29 (b) reads : "Every contract made in violation of any 
provi<>ion of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, an4 
~very contract (including any contract for listing a security on at!-
' . 
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for contracts which have an international character. 
The 1933 Act, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77n had a like 
provision in its § 14: 
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding 
any person acquiring any security to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this subchapter or of 
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be 
void." 
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, a customer brought 
suit against a brokerage house alleging fraud in the sale 
of stock. A motion was made to stay the trial until an 
arbitration under the U. S. Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. 
§ 3. as provided in the customer's contract. The Court 
held that an agreement for arbitration was a "stipula-
tion" within the meaning of~ 14 which sought to "waive" 
compliance with the Act. We accordingly held that the 
courts, not the arbitration tribunals, had jurisdiction over 
suits under the Act. The arbitration agency, we held, 
was bound by other standards which were not necessarily 
consistent with the 1933 Act. We said : 
"As the protective provisions of the Securities 
Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly 
assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Con-
gress must have intended § 14 ... to apply to waiver 
of judicial trial and review." !d., at437. 
exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which 
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or 
practice in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or 
regulation thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of 
any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regula-
tion, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such 
contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being 
a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder 
with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or 
performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision, 
rule or regttlation ...• " 15 U. S. C. § 78cc (b) . 
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Wilko was held by the Court of Appeals to control this 
case-and properly so. 
It could perhaps be argued that Wilko does not govern 
because it involved a little customer pitted against a big 
brokerage house, while we deal here with sophisticated 
buyers and sellers: Scherk. a powerful German operator, 
and Alberto. an American business surroullded and pro-
tected by lawyers and experts. But that would miss the 
point of the problem. The Act does not speak in tenns 
of "sophisticated" as opposed to "tmsophisticated" pMplEJ 
dealing ill securities. The Rules when the giants play 
are the same as when the pigmies enter the market. 
If there are victims here, they are 'not Alberto the 1 
corporation, but the thousands of investors who are the 
security holders in Alberto-Culver Co. If there is fraud 
and the promissory notes are excessive, the impact is on 
the equity in Alberto-Culver Co. 
Moreover, the securities market these days is not made 
up of a host of small people scrambling to get in and out 
of stocks or other securities. The markets are over-
shadowed by huge institutional traders.2 The so-called 
11off-shore funds" of which Scherk is a member present 
perplexing problems under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.8 
The tendency of American investors to invest indirectly 
as through mutual funds 4 may change the character of 
the regulation but not its need. 
There has been much support for arbitration of dis-
putes; and it may be the superior way of settling some dis-
agreements. If A and B were quarreling over a trade-
mark and there was an arbitration clause in the contract, 
the policy of Congress in implementing the United N~ 
2 Sec In~ti tutional Investor Study Rex)ort of t.he SEC, H. ~ - Doc. 
No 92-64 ( 1971) , particularly Vol. 4, 
SJd., p. XVI, p. 879 et seq. 
"ld., p. XIX, p. 215 et seq. 
' . 
73-781-DISSENT 
SCHERK v. ALBERTO-CULVER CO. 
tions Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Arbitral Aw·ards as it did in 9 U. S. C. 
§ 201 et seq., would prevail. But the Act does not sub-
stitute an arbiter for the settlement of disputes under 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Art. II (3) of the Convention 
says: 
"The court of a Contracting State, when seized 
of an action in a matter in respect of which the 
parties have made an agreement within the meaning 
of this article, shall, at the request of one of the 
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds 
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative 
or incapable of being performed." 5 
But § 29 (a) of the 1934 Act makes arbitration of lia-
bilities under ~ 10 of the 1934 Act "void" and "inopera-
tive." Congress has specified a precise way whereby big 
and small investors will be protected and the rules under 
wihch the Alberto-Culver Co/s of this Nation shall op-
erate. They or their lawyers cannot waive those statu-
tory conditions, for our corporate giants are not princi-
palities of power but guardians of a host of wards unable 
to care for themselves. It is these wards that the 1934 
Act tries to protect.'; Not a word in the convention gov-
r. The Convention al~o pPrmits that nrbitral awards not be 
recognized and pnforced wlwn a court in the country where enforce-
ment. ls sought find<; that ''thr recognition and enforcement of the 
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." 
Article V (2) (b) . It aliso providP;:; that recognition of an award 
may be rrfusrd when thr arbitration agreement ''is not valid under 
the law to which thr partir;; havr ~ubjectrd it," in this ca~:;e the hws 
of Illinois. See n. 10, infra. Article V (1) (a) . 
6 Requirements promulgated under the 1934 Act requirr revela-
tion to security holder~ of corpornte action which may nffect them. 
Extenstve annual report.~ must be filed with the SEC including, 
irtter alia, financial figurr;:;, change~; in t hP conduct of business, tho 
acqm~Jtion or dispo~itiou of assQti>, increase~; or decreases in out. 
73-781-DISSENT 
SCHEltK v. ALBEltTO-CULVER CO. 
erning awards adopts the standards which Congress has 
passed to protect the investors under the 1934 Act. It is 
peculiarly appropriate that we adhere to Wilko-more so 
even than when Wilko was adopted. Huge foreign in-
vestments, many of them composed of the blackmail 
money we now pay for oil, are being made in our com-
panies. It is important that American standards of fair• 
ness in security dealings, rather than these impromptu 
ones framed by "some friend in an arbital court in Paris'' 
govern the destinies of American investors-until Con• 
gress changes these standards. 
The Court finds it unnecessary to consider Scherk's 
argument that this case is distinguishable from Wilko in 
that Wilko involved parties of unequal bargaining 
strength. Ante, at 6 n. 6. Instead, the Court rests its 
standing ::;ecurities, and even the importance to the business of trade-
marks held. See 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-1, 249.310; 3 CCH Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. ~31,101 et seq. (Form 10 K). The Commission has pro-
posed that corporations furnish a copy of annual reports filed with 
the SEC to any security holder who is solicited for a proxy and re-
quests the report. 39 Fed. Reg. 3836. Current reports must be 
filed with the SEC by an issuer of securities when substantial events 
occur, as when the rights evidenced by any class of securities are' 
materially altered by the issuance of another class of securities or 
when an issuer ha::; acquired a significant amount of assets other than 
in thP. ordinary course of business. See 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-ll, 
249.308; 3 CCH Ff'd. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 31,001 et seq. (Form 8-K). 
The SEC, recogmzing that the Form 10-K r!:'port::; filed annually 
with the Commission might. be !:'xcessively abstruse for security hold-
ers, ·ee 39 Fed. Reg. 3835, has proposed that the annual reports dis-
tributed to security holders in connection with annual meetings and 
solicitation of proxies provide substantially greater amounts of 
Jheanmgful information than required presently. These annual re-
ports would include a description of the busines::; of the issuer, a 
summary of operations, explanation of changes in revenues and ex-
penses, informa.tion on the liquidity position and the working capital 
requirements of the issuer, and identification of management and' 
performance on the market of the issuer's securities. See 39 Fed~ 
Reg. 3834-3838. 
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-conclusion on the fact that this was an "international'' 
agreement. with an American corporation investing in 
the stock and property of foreign businesses, and speaks 
favorably of the certainty which inheres when parties 
specify an arbitral forum for resolution of differences in 
"any contract touching two or more countries." 
This invocation of the "international contract" talis-
man could as easily be applied to a situation where, for 
example, an interest in a foreign company or mutual 
fund was sold to an utterly unsophisticated American 
citizen, with material fraudulent misrepresentations made 
in this country. The arbitration clause could appear in 
the fine print of a form contract, and still be sufficient 
to preclude recourse to our courts, forcing the defrauded 
citizen to arbitration in Paris to vindicate his rights. 
It has been recognized that the 1934 Act, including 
the protections of Rule lOb-5, applies when foreign 
defendants have defrauded American investors, particu-
larly when, as alleged here/ they have profited by virtue 
of proscribed conduct within our boundaries. This is 
true even when the defendant is organized under the 
laws of a foreign country, is conducting much of its 
activity outside the United States, and is therefore gov-
erned largely by foreign law.8 The language of § 29 of 
7 Th8 District Court for the 'Northern Di~trict of Illinois noted 
allegations that Scherk bad failed to state a matrrial fact the omis-
siOn of which would have bren misleading, see 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 
(2), during crucial negotiations in Melrose Park, Illinois, and that 
communications betwren Alberto and Scherk'~> attorney concerning 
the validity and value of the trademark;; occurred within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of t]w United StatC's. Finally, the District Court 
noted that the full economic impact of the alleged fraud occurred 
within thC' UnitPd States. 
8 SeP, e. g., Leasco Data Processing Equip . Cm·p. v. Maxwell, 468 
F . 2d 1326, 1334-1339 (CA2 1972) ; T1·avis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 
473 F. 2d 515, 52:3-528 (CA8 1973); SEC' v. United Financial Group, 
lnc., 474 F . 2cl 354 (CA9 1973) ; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 
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the 1934 Act does not immunize such international trans-
actions, and the United Nations Convention provides 
that a forum court in which a suit is brought need not 
enforce an agreement to arbitrate which is "void" and 
"inoperative" as contrary to its public policy." When a 
2d 200 (CA2 1968); Roth v. Fund of Fund&. 279 F. Supp. 935, aff'd, 
405 F. 2d 421 (CA2 1968). 
0 A summary of the conference proceedings which led to the adop" 
tion of the United Natiohs Convention was prepared by G. W. Haight, 
who served as a member of the International Chamber of Commerce 
delegation to the conference. G. Haight, Convention on the Recog• 
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Sumary Analy· 
sis of Record of United Nations Conference, Mayj June 1958 (1958) . 
When Art. II (3) wa~ being discussed, the Israeli delegate pointed 
out that while a court could, under the draft Convention as it then 
stood, refuse enforcement of an award which was incompatible with 
public policy, " 't he court had to refer parties to arbitration whether 
or not such reference was lawful or incompatible with public policy.'" 
!d., at 27. The German delegate observed that this difficulty arose 
from the omission in Art. II (3) "'of any words which would relate 
the nrbit.ral agreement to an arbitral award capable of enforcement 
under the convention.',. Ibid . 
Haight continue ·: 
"When the German propo:;al was put to a vote, it failed to obtain 
u two-thirds majority (13 to 9) and the Article wa::; thus adopted 
without, any wordii linking agreements to the award:; enforceable 
undN the Convention. Nor was this omission corrected in the 
ReporL of the Drafting Committee (1.61), although the obligatwn 
to refer parties to arbitration was (and still is) qualified by the 
clause 'unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative 
or incapable of being performed.' 
' 'As the applicable law i~:; not indicated, courts may under this 
wording be allowed some latitude ; they may find an agreement 
incapable of performance if it offends the lau• or the public policy 
vf the forum . Apart from this limited opening. the Conference 
appeared unwilling to qualify the broad undertaking not. only to 
recognize but also to give effect to arbitral agreements.'' I d., at 28 
( empha~i~ added). 
Whatever ''concern" the delegate~ had that ~ignatories to the Con-
vention "not be permitted to decline enforcement of suc)l agree-
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foreign corporation undertakes fraudulent action which 
subjects it to the jurisdiction of our federal securities laws, 
nothing justifies the conclusion that only a diluted ver-
sion of those laws protect American investors. 
Section 29 (a) of the Act provides that a stipulation 
biuding one to waive compliance with "any provision" 
'of the 1934 Act shall be void, and the 1934 Act expressly 
provides that the federal district courts shall have "exclu-
sive jurisdiction" over suits brought under the Act. 15 
U. S. C. § 78aa. The Court appears to attach some 
significance to the fact that the specific provisions of thfl 
1933 Act involved in Wilko are not duplicated in the 
1934 Act, which is involved in this case. While Alberto 
would not have the right to sue in either a state or federal 
forum as did the plaintiff in Wilko, 346 U. S., at 431, 
the Court deprives it of its right to have its lOb-5 claim 
heard in a federal court. We spoke at length in Wilko 
of this problem, elucidating the undesirable effects of 
remitting a securities plaintiff to an arbitral, rather than 
a judicial, forum. Here, as in Wilko, the allegations of 
ments on the bru;is of parochial view~ of their desirability," ante, 
at 12 n. 12, it would seem that they contemplated that a court may 
decline to enforce an agreement which offends its law or public 
policy. 
The Court. al~o attempts to treat this ca:oe as only a minor varia-
lion of 1'he Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1. In that 
ca:-;e, however, the Court, per BuRGER, C. J ., explicitly ~tatecl that: 
"A contractual choice-of-forum rlause :,;hould be held unenforceable 
if the enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the 
forum in which suit is brought , whether declared by statute or by 
judicial decision." I d., at 15. 
That is mescapably the case herE', as § 29 of the SecuritiE'~:~ Exchange 
Act and Wilko v. Swan make ciE'ar. Nl'ither § 29, nor the Conven-
tJon on international arbitration , nor The Bremen justifies abandon-
ment of a national publir polic~· that ;;ecuritil's claims be heard by 
a judicial forum simply becau:oe some international elements are 
involvecl in a contract .• 
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fraudulent misrepresentation will involve "subjective 
findings on the purpose and knowledge" of the defendant, 
questions ill determined by arbitrators without judicial 
instruction on the law. See id., at 435-436. An arbitral 
award can be made without explication of reasons and 
with development of a record, so that the arbitrator's 
conception of our statutory requirement may be absolutely 
incorrect yet functionally unreviewable. even when the 
arbitrator seeks to apply our law, We recognized in 
Wilko that there is no judicial review correstJonding to 
review of court decisions. !d., at 436-437. The exten• 
$ive pretrial discovery provided by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure for actions in District Court would not 
be available. And the wide choice of venue provided by 
the 1934 Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78aa, would be forfeited. See 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S., at 431, 435. The loss of the 
proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substan-
tial righ ts. 10 
When a defendant, as alleged here, has through pro-
scribed acts within our territory brought itself within 
the ken of federal securities regulation. a fact not dis- · 
puted here. those laws-including the controlling prin-
ciples of Wilko-apply whether the defendant is foreign : 
or American, and whether or not there are transnational 
elements in the dealings. Those laws are rendered a 
chimera when foreign corporations or funds-unlike 
domestic defendants-can nullify them by virtue of 
to Tho agrrcment:; in thi~ caso providrd that the "laws of the 
State of Illinois" are applicable. Even if the urbitration court 
should reud this clau:;fl to re({uirfl application of Rule 10b--5's 
stundurds, Alberto';; victory would be Pyrrhic. The arbitral court 
mar improperly interpret the sub~tantive protections of the Rule, 
and if it does it:; error will no1 be reviewable as would the error 
of a federal court. And the abil~ty of Alberto to prosecute its 
1
. 
claim would be !'VISCerated by lack of ~covery. The;;e are the aAA 
policy con;;ideration;; which underlay Wilko and which apply to the 
JOi:itanL case as well. 
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arbitration clauses which send defrauded American inves-
tors to the uncertainty of arbitration on foreign soil, or, 
what may be more likely, to no remedy at all. 
Moreover, the international aura which the Court gives 
this case is ominous. We now have many multi-national 
corporations in vast operations around the world-Eu-
rope, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. The in-
vestments of many American investors turn on dealings 
by these companies. pp to ·this day, it has been assumed 
by reason of Wilko that they were all protected by our 
various federal securities Acts. If these guarantees are 
to be removed, it should take a legislative enactment. 
I would enforce our laws as they stand, unless Congress 
makes an exception. 
The virtue of certainty in international agreements is 
important, but Congress has dictated that when there 
. are sufficient contacts for our securities laws to apply, 
the policies expressed in those laws take precedence. 
Section 29, which renders arbitration clauses void and 
inoperative, recognizes no exception for fraudulent deal-
ings which incidentally have some international factors, 
The Convention makes provision for such national public 
policy in Art. II (3). Federal jurisdiction under the 1934 
Act will attach only to some international transactions, 
but when it does, the protections afforded investors such 
as Alberto can only be full-fledged. 
To repeat, the interests of investors in American 
.companies are involved here. Justice Brandeis starting 
· nearly 70 years ago tried to educate the Nation on the 
practices of the money trust. The giants of finance are 
the money trust today. They are the ones that fought 
· the 1933 and 1934 Acts tooth and nail. They are the 
; ones hopeful of short circuiting the protective devices 
of those Acts by using arbitration as a newly found 
loophole. 
1fp/ss 
No. 73-781 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 
Suggested note to be added to the opinion of the Court: 
"We do not reach, or infer any opinion as to, the 
question whether the acquisition of Scherk's businesses 
was a security transaction within the meaning of § lO(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Although this important question was considered by the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals, and the dissenting 
opinion, infra, seems to consider it controlling, petitioner 
did not assign the adverse ruling on the Question as error 
and it was not briefed or argued in this Court." 
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Justice Dcuglas 
J ustice }~:r:.::nnan 
Justice Vlh'te 
Mr . Jvstlce I"· ·shall 
Mr . Justice Fl~~kmun 
---Mr . Justice F ;;all 
Mr. J ustice ll"lmquist 
4th DRAFT From: Stewar~. J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STcATESated: 
No. 73- 781 Recirculated: JUN '( ~~ 
Fritz Scherk Petitioner l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v' ' United States Court of 
Alb C 1 
· C Appeals for the Seventh 
erto- u ver ompany. c· 't 
IrCUl • 
[June -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Alberto-Culver Co., the respondent, is an American 
company incorporated in Delaware with its principal 
office in Illinois. It manufactures and distributes toilet-
ries and hair products in this country and abroad. Dur-
ing the 1960's Alberto-Culver decided to expand its 
overseas operations, and as part of this program it 
approached the petitioner Fritz Scherk, a German citizen 
residing at the time of trial in Switzerland. Scherk was 
the owner of three interrelated business entities, orga-
nized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, that 
were engaged in the manufacture of toiletries and the 
licensing of trademarks for such toiletries. An initial 
contact with Scherk was made by a representative of 
Alberto-Culver in Germany in June, 1967, and negotia~ 
tions followed at further meetings in both Europe and 
the United States during 1967 and 1968. In February, 
1969 a contract was signed in Vienna, Austria, which pro-
vided for the transfer of the ownership of Scherk's enter-
prises to Alberto-Culver, along with all rights held by 
these enterprises to trademarks in cosmetic goods. The 
contract contained a number of express warranties 
wllereby Scherk guaranteed the sole and unencumber~d 
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ownership of these trademarks. In addition, the coli" 
tract contained an arbitration clause providing that "any 
controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agree-
ment or the breach thereof" would be referred to arbi-
tration before the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris, France, and that "[t]he laws of the State of 
Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agree-
ment, its interpretation and performance." 1 
The closing of the transaction took place in Geneva, 
Switzerland, in June 1969. Nearly one year later 
Alberto-Culver allegedly discovered that the trademark 
rights purchased under the contract were subject to sub-
stantial encumbrances that threatened to give others 
superior rights to the trademarks and to restrict or pre-
clude Alberto-Culver's use of them. Alberto-Culver 
thereupon tendered back to Scherk the property that had 
been transferred to it and offered to rescind the contract. 
Upon Scherk's refusal, Alberto-Culver commenced this 
action for damages and other relief in a federal district 
1 The arbitration clause relating to the transfer of ~me of Scherk's 
business entities, similar to the clauses covering the other two, reads 
in its entirety as follows : 
"The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out 
of the agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request 
that the matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be 
settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules then 
obtaimng of the International Chamber of Commerce, Pari8, France, 
by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one 
arbitrator appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed 
by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party to make 
an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of 
the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said Chamber. 
All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each 
party agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any 
such proceeding and to the entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction 
upon any award rendered in such proceeding. The laws of the State 
of Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, jts 
, )llter;pretatwn and performance." 
' . 
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the "desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the 
complications of litigation," id., at 431, but nonetheless 
declined to apply the Act's provisions. That case 
involved an agreement between Anthony Wilko and 
Hayden, Stone & Co., a large brokerage firm, under which 
Wilko agreed to purchase on margin a number of shares 
of a corporation's common stock. Wilko alleged that 
his purchase of the stock was induced by false represen-
tations on the part of the defendant concerning the value 
of the shares, and he brought suit for damages under 
§ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 71l. 
The defendant responded that Wilko had agreed to sub-
mit all controversies arising out of the purchase to arbi• 
tration, and that this agreement, contained in a written 
margin contract between the parties, should be given full 
effect under the Arbitration Act, 
The Court found that " [ t] wo policies, not easily rec-
oncilable, [are] involved in this case." 346 U. S., at 
438. On the one hand, the Arbitration Act stressed "the 
need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation," id.1 
at 431, and directed that such agreements be "valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable" in federal courts. On the 
other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 was " [ d] esigned to 
protect investors" and to require "issuers, underwriters, 
and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the charac .. 
ter of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce 
and to prevent fraud in their sale," by creating "a special 
right to recover for misrepresentation .... " !d., at 431 
(footnote omitted). In particular, the Court noted that 
§ 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77n, provides: 
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding 
any person acquiring any security to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this subchapter or of 
the rules and regulations of the Commission shall 
be void." 
The Court ruled that an agreement to arbitrate "is a 
73-781-0PIN!ON 
SCHERK v. ALBERTO-CULVER CO. 
'stipulation/ and [that] the right to select the judicial 
forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived 
under § 14 of the Securities Act." 6 Thus, Wilko's 
advance agreement to arbitrate any disputes subse-
quently arising out of his contract to purchase the securi-
ties was unenforcable under the terms of § 14 of the 
Securities Act of 1933. 
Alberto-Culver, relying on this precedent, contends 
that the District Court and Court of Appeals were correct 
in holding that its agreement to arbitrate disputes arising 
under the contract with Scherk is similarly unenforceable 
in view of its contentions that Scherk's conduct consti-
tuted violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and rules promulgated thereunder.. For the reasons that 
follow, we reject this contention and hold that the pro-
VIsions of the Arbitration Act cannot be ignored in this 
.case. 
At the outset, a colorable argument could be made that 
even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does 
not control the case before us. Wilko concerned a suit 
brought under ~ 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
which provides a defrauded purchaser with the "special 
right" of a private remedy for civil liability, 346 U.S., at 
6 The arbitration agreement involved in Wilko was contained in a 
standard form margin contract. But see the dissenting opinion of 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 346 U. S., at 439, 440, concluding that the 
record did not show that "the plaintiff [Wilko] in opening an ac-
count had no choice but to accept the arbitration stipulation . ... " 
The petitioner here would limit the decision in Wilko to situations 
where the parties exhibit a disparity of bargaining power, and con-
tends that, since the negotiations leading to the present contract took 
place over a number of years and involved the participation on both 
sides of knowledgeable and sophisticated business and legal experts, 
the Wilko decision should not apply. See also the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Stevens of the Court of Appeals in this case, 484 F. 2d, at 
615. Because of our disposition of this case on other grounds, we 
need not consider this contention. 
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431 There is no statutory counterpart of§ 12 (2) in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and neither § 10 (b) 
of that Act nor Rule 10b-5 speaks of a private remedy 
to redress violations of the kind alleged here. While 
federal case law has established that § 10 (b) and Rule 
lOb-5 create an implied private cause of action, see 
6 Loss, Securities 3869-3873 (1969) and cases cited 
therein; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Boraie, 377 U. S. 426 ( 1963), 
the Act itself does not establish the "special right" that 
the Court in Wilko found significant. Furthermore1 
while both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 contain sections barring waiver of 
compliance with any "provision'' of the respective acts/ 
certain of the "provisions" of the 1933 Act that the Court 
held could not be waived by Wilko's agreement to arbi· 
trate find no counterpart in the 1934 Act. In particular, 
the Court in Wilko noted that the jurisdictional provision 
of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77v, allowed a plaintiff to 
bring suit "in any court of competent jurisdiction-
federal or state--and removal from a state court is pro· 
hibited." 346 U. S .. at 431. The analogous provision 
of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for suit only in the 
federal district courts that have "exclusive jurisdiction," 
7 Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77n, 
provides as follows : 
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person ac~ 
qmring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this 
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be· 
void ." 
Section 29 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78cc (a), provides : 
"Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to 
waive compliance w1th any prov1sion of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby 
shall be void " 
While the two sections are not identical, the variations in their word-
ing seem trrelevant to the issue presented m this case, 
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15 U.S. C. § 78aa, thus significantly restricting the plain;a 
tiff's choice of forum.~ 
Accepting the premise, however, that the operative 
portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in 
Wilko are contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the respondent's reliance on Wilko in this case 
ignores the significant and, we find, crucial differences 
between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one 
signed by the parties here. Alberto-Culver's contract 
to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was 
a truly international agreement. Alberto-Culver is an 
American corporation with its principal place of business 
and the vast bulk of its activity in this country, while 
Scherk is a citizen of Germany whose companies were 
organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein. 
The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract 
in Austria and to the closing in Switzerland took place 
in the United States, England, and Germany, and 
involved consultations with legal and trademark experts 
from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein. 
Finally, and most significantly, the subject matter of the 
contract concerned the sale of business enterprises orga-
nized under the laws of and primarily situated in Euro-
pean countries, and whose activities were largely, if not 
entirely, directed to European markets. 
Such a contract involves considerations and policies 
significantly different from those found controlling in 
Wilko. In Wilko, quite apart from the arbitration pro.. --G) 
" We do not reach, or imply any opunon a~ to the question 
whrther thr acqui~ition of Srlwrk',; buo;inr~;;e:; wa>' a ~ecmity trans, 
action within thE' mrnnmg of § 10 (b) and Rulr lOb-5 of the 
Secuntif'ti Exchangr Act of 1934. Although tbi~ important. question 
was con;;Idrred by t hr Di"trict Court and the Court of Appeals, 
and altl.ough the di"~rnting opinion, post, ~erm;; to consider it 
controlling, the petitimwr did not a~sign thr adver;;r ruling on the 
que"tion a:; error and 11 wa~ not briefed or argurd in this Court .. 
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vision, there was no question but that the laws of the 
United States generally, and the federal s~curities laws 
in particular, would govern disputes arising out of the 
stock purchase agreement. The parties, the negotia-
tions, and the subject matter of the contract were all 
situated in this country, and no credible claim could have 
been entertained that any international conflict of laws 
problems would arise. In this case, by contrast, in the 
absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncer .. 
tainty existed at the time of the agreement1 and still 
exists, concerning the law applicable to the resolution of 
disputes arising out of the contract.u 
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with 
respect to any contract touching two or more countries; 
each with its own substantive laws and conflict of law 
rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance tha 
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to 
be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precon.-
dition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability 
essential to any international business transaction. Fur-
thermore, such a provision obviates the danger that ti 
dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a 
forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or 
unfamiliar with the problem area involved.10 
"Together vnth Its motion for a stay prndmg arbitration, Scher~ 
moved that the complaint be dismissed because the federal securi-
ties laws do not apply to this international transaction, cf. Leasca 
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F. 2d 1326 (CA2 
1972) . Since only the order granting the injunction was appealed', 
this contention was not considered by the Court of Appeals and is 
not before this Court. 
'" Sre Q\llglry, Acce::;::<ion b~· thr United State;; to the United Na-
tion;; Convention on the Herognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yair L. .J. 1049, 1051 (1961) . For example, 
while the arbitration agrrenwnt involvrcl here provided that the 
cont rover::;Il'S nri~ing out of the agreement be reo;olved under " [ t] he 
law;; of thr State of IllinOJ,.;," supra, n. 1, a determination of the 
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A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to 
enforce an international arbitration agreement would 
not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite 
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the 
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the 
present case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if 
Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would be 
able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he 
might have sought an order in France or some other 
country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding with 
its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition 
the courts of this country might ultimately have granted 
to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of 
such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the 
fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil 
the willingnes and ability of businessmen to enter into 
international commercial agreements.11 
exi~tence and extent of fraud concerning the trademarks would 
necr~~aril)' mvolvr an 1mdC'rstanding of for0ign law on that subject. 
11 The dissenting opinion ar!!;ues that our conclusion that Wilko 
is inapplicabiC' to the ~ituation presented in this case will vitiate 
tlw force of that drci:-;Iou bt>causC' parties to tran~actions with many 
morE' direct contact:, w1th tlu:-; country than in the present case will 
nonethrle::;::; be ablr to invoke the ''talisman" of having an " inter-
national contract." Post, at 8. ConcedE'dly, ~ituations may arise 
when· thr contact:; w1th foreign countriE's arE' so insignificant or 
attE'mmted that tlw holding m Wilko would mraningfully apply. 
Judicial response to ::;uch situations can and should await future 
litigation in concrPtC' ca::;e~. This cal:le, howevE'r, providrs no basis 
for a Judgment that only United States laws and United States 
courts ~hould detrnmnr tlm controver~y m the face of a solemn 
agrrE'mrnt betwern the part!(';; that such controvrrsies be resolved 
rl~ewhrrr. TllC.only contacts brtwec>n thE' United States and the 
tranHaction mvolvrd here Is the fact. that Alberto-Culver is an 
Amencan corporatiOn and the occurrence of some--but by no means 
the grc>at,'r part-of the prrrontmct. negotiations in this country. 
To determine that "American ~tandard<> of fairnE's ·," post, at 7, 
must nonC'thelr;;s govern the controversy, or to imply that tl1e 
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The exception to the clear provisions of the Arbitration 
Act carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case 
such as the one before us. In Wilko the Court reasoned 
that "[w]hen the security buyer, prior to any violation 
of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he 
gives up more than would a participant in other business 
transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of 
courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advan-
tages the Act gives him . . . . " 346 U. S., at 435. In the 
context of an international contract, however, these 
advantages become chimerical since, as indicated above, 
an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign 
court block or hinder access to the American court of the 
purchaser's choice. D 
Two Terms ago in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U. S. 1, we rejected the doctrine that a forum-
selection clause of a contract, although voluntarily 
adopted by the parties, will not be respected in a suit 
brought in the United States "unless the selected state 
would provide a more convenient forum than the state 
in which suit is brought." !d., at 7. Rather, we con-
cluded that a "forum clause should control absent a 
strong showing that it should be set aside." /d., at 15. 
We noted that "much uncertainty and possibly great 
inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could 
be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident 
forum agrrrd upon wlil p rovidr " no remedy at all ," post, a t 12, 
clrmrans tht• ~tanda rd~ of ju;;ticr r lsewhr re in t he world , and un-
nrcr:;sarily Pxalts thr pnmac~· of Unit rd Stat es law over tlw laws 
of ot hr r countne:>. 
u The dis;;enting opinion rm;;r~ the ;;prcter t hat our holding today 
Will leavr Amrrican inve~tor~ at the mercy of mul tinat ional cor-
JlOmtionH with ''vast oprration;; around the world .... " Post, 
a t. 12. Our drci::;wn, of cour~e, ha::; no bearing on the scope of 
thr substan tiw provi~ I on;; of thr fedrra l srcmities laws for the· 
:-;1mplr rraHon that t hr qur:-;tion 1::; not prrsrnt~d m t his case. See 
ll. /'<, SUIJI'O 
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might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place 
[where personal or in rem jurisdiction might be estab-
lished]. The elimination of all such uncertainties by 
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties 
is an indispensable element in international trade, com-
merce, and contracting." I d., at 13-14. 
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal 
is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause 
that posits not only the situs of suit but also the pro-
cedure to be used in resolving the dispute."l The invali-
dation of such an agreement in the case before us would 
not only allow the respondent to repudiate his solemn 
promise but would, as well, reflect a "parochial concept 
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in 
our courts ... , We cannot have trade and commerce 
in world markets and international waters exclusively on 
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our 
courts. ld., at 9.1< 
13 Under some cJrcmnstance;;, thP de::;ignation of arbitration in a 
certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of 
that place to apply to that transaction. In this case, however, "[t]he 
laws gf the State of Illinois" were explicitly made applicable by the 
arbitration agreement. See n. 1, supra. 
1~ ln The Bremen we noted that. forum-selection clauses "should be 
given full effect" when "a freely negotiated private international 
agreement [is] unaffected by fraud .... " 407 U. S. 1, 12-13. This 
qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of 
a transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud, as in this case, the 
·clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that an arbitration or 
forum-selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclusion 
.of that clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion, 
Compare Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395. 
Although we do not decidr the queJ:>tion , presumably the type of 
fraud alleged herE' cou~d be rai~E'd , unc!E'r Art. V of the Convention 
on the RPcognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
sre n. 12, infra, in challenging the enforcement of whatever arbitral 
award is produced through :~rbitration. Article V (2) (b) of the 
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For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of 
the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising 
out of their internatibnal commercial transaction is to be 
respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord 
with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act.10 
Convention provide~ that a country may refus0 recognition and 
enforcement of an award if "recognition or enforcement of the 
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country. 11 
15 Our conclusion today is confirmed by international develop-
ments and domestic legislation in the area of commercial arbitra .. 
tion subsequent to the Wilko decision. On June 10, 1958, a special 
conference of the Uhited Nations Economic and Social Council 
adopted the Convention on the Reiloghitlon and Enforcement of 
Forrign Arbitral Award~. In 1970 the United States acceded to 
the treaty, [1970] 3 U. S. T . 2517 , T. I. A. S. No. 6997, and Con-
gress passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 
U. S. C. §§ 201 ff., m order to implement the Convention. Section 
1 of the new chapter provides unequivocally that the Convention 
"shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this 
chapter." 
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying 
American adoption ahd implementation of it, was to encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in 
International contracts and to unify the standards by which agree-
ments to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in 
the signatory countries. See Convention on the Recognition and En~ 
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. E. 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1968); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L. J. 1049 (1961) . Article II (1) of the 
Convention provides: 
"Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing 
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or 
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them 
ln respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual 
or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration." 
In their discussion of this Article, the delegates to the Convention 
voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which 
an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be per-
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered, 
mitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of 
parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would 
diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements. See Haight, 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference 
24-28 (1958) . 
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from 
the considerations expressed in this opinion, would require of its 
own force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present 
case, we think that this country's adoption and ratification of the 
Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbi-
tration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional 
policy consistent with the decision we reach today. 
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